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Insurance
Thomas D. Martin*
Bradley S. Wolff **
Maren R. Cave***
I. INTRODUCTION
During this Survey period, the courts in Georgia remained active
despite the pandemic.1 In the property arena, the Survey disclosed only
a few decisions from the Georgia Court of Appeals but several from the
district courts in Georgia as parties grappled with coverage disputes
relating to policy time limits, bad faith, and the effects of COVID-19 on
business losses. In the automobile arena, the Georgia Court of Appeals
addressed sovereign immunity, and the Georgia Supreme Court refined
the “cause test” for evaluating a series of collisions. In the uninsured
motorist (UM) arena, the court of appeals weighed in on various issues
relating to UM coverage, including late notice, vehicles that qualify for
UM coverage, and renewal actions against UM carriers. In the thirdparty arena, the relevant decisions during the Survey period concerned
responses to time-limited demands and the ongoing complexities
associated with responding appropriately.

*Partner,

Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers. University of Georgia (B.A., summa cum laude,
1984); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1987). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
**Partner, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers. Vanderbilt University (B.A., cum laude, 1983);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
***Partner, Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers. St. Olaf College (B.A., 1997); Mercer University
School of Law (J.D., 2000). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Insurance Law during the prior Survey period, see Maren R.
Cave, Thomas D. Martin, and Bradley S. Wolff, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law,
72 MERCER L. REV. 131 (2020).
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II. PROPERTY INSURANCE CASES
A. Agency
In American Reliable Insurance Co. v. Lancaster,2 the Lancasters
brought suit against American Reliable Insurance Company (American)
and an insurance agent asserting breach of their policy and bad faith. 3
The Lancasters purchased insurance for their property from a local
insurance agent. They remitted their first premium payment to the
agent. Subsequently, American issued a policy to the Lancasters. Toward
the end of the policy period, American mailed a renewal notice to the
Lancasters informing them of the sum due to renew the policy and how
to pay the premium through American’s website or via mail. The notice
also indicated that the policy sent was a direct-bill policy as opposed to
an agency-bill policy. The Lancasters claimed that they never received
this notice.4
Eventually, American mailed a notice to the Lancasters informing
them that it would terminate their policy if they did not pay the
premiums. This notice also included instructions on how to pay. The
Lancasters claimed that they never received the notice. Instead, the
Lancasters paid premiums to the same local agent from whom they
acquired the policy. When the Lancasters suffered a total fire loss, they
requested coverage. American denied their claim. The Lancasters
brought suit against American and the agent. 5
The Bleckley Superior Court concluded that there were genuine issues
concerning the agent’s status.6 The court of appeals disagreed. The court
of appeals held that the agent was not an actual or apparent agent of
American for purposes of accepting renewal premiums. 7 American’s
notices indicated that customers should pay premiums directly to
American. The Lancasters failed to show that American authorized the
agent to accept the premium payments on its behalf. 8 The court also
rejected the Lancasters’ claim that American’s cancellation did not bind
them because they never received it. American’s proof of mailing from
the United States Postal Service was sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of notice.9 Besides, the policy expired by its own terms for
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

356 Ga. App. 854, 849 S.E.2d 697 (2020).
Id. at 854, 849 S.E.2d at 698.
Id. at 854–55, 849 S.E.2d at 698–99.
Id. at 855–56, 849 S.E.2d at 699.
Id. at 856, 849 S.E.2d at 699.
Id. at 857, 849 S.E.2d at 700.
Id. at 858, 849 S.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 859–60, 849 S.E.2d at 701–02.
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non-payment; thus, a cancellation notice from American was not
required.10 Finally, because the Lancasters’ claims against American
failed as a matter of law, so too did their claims under the bad faith
statute, section 33-4-6 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. 11
B. Suit Limitation Periods
In Premier Eye Care Associations v. Mag Mutual Insurance Co.,
Premier Eye Care Associates, P.C. (Premier) brought suit against Mag
Mutual Insurance Company (MAG) claiming breach of an insurance
policy and bad faith.12 A leak from a restaurant located in a suite above
Premier damaged Premier’s office. Premier submitted various claims
with MAG. MAG made multiple payments to Premier for personal
property damages, expenses, and loss of income. Then, for months, MAG
did not make any additional payments to Premier as the parties
negotiated a possible settlement on remaining claims. When negotiations
failed, MAG paid its assessment of Premier’s business interruption
claim.13
Dissatisfied with MAG’s payments, Premier made a bad faith demand.
The parties attempted mediation but were unsuccessful. Approximately
two years after failed negotiations and over three years after the loss
occurred, Premier filed suit against MAG. MAG filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that Premier’s complaint was time-barred by a two-year time
limit in the policy. In response, Premier argued that MAG waived the
suit limitation provision when it paid portions of the claim and engaged
in mediation within months of the two-year deadline. Premier also
argued that MAG could not enforce the time limit because MAG breached
the contract and acted in bad faith. The Fulton State Court granted
MAG’s motion.14
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed.15 The court of appeals
reiterated an oft-stated principle that “mere negotiation for settlement,
unsuccessfully accomplished, is ‘not that type of conduct designed to lull
the claimant into a false sense of security so as to constitute a waiver of
the limitation defense.’”16 Premier was aware that MAG did not intend
to fully pay the amounts that Premier claimed because MAG did not
10. Id. at 860, 849 S.E.2d at 702.
11. Id. at 861, 849 S.E.2d at 702; see O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (2021).
12. 355 Ga. App. 620, 844 S.E.2d 282 (2020).
13. Id. at 620–23, 844 S.E.2d at 284–86.
14. Id. at 622, 844 S.E.2d at 285.
15. Id. at 628, 844 S.E.2d at 289.
16. Id. at 626, 844 S.E.2d at 288 (quoting Stone Mountain Collision Ctr. v. Gen. Cas.
Co. of Wis., 307 Ga. App. 394, 396, 705 S.E.2d 163, 165 (2010)).
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acquiesce to numerous letters Premier sent complaining about the
inadequacy of MAG’s payments. Moreover, although MAG participated
in mediation, the parties failed to reach a settlement after which Premier
had approximately seven months to file suit before the two-year
limitation period expired. Premier did not submit any evidence to show
that MAG continued to negotiate or even communicate at all during that
time.17 Nevertheless, Premier waited almost two more years before filing
suit. Accordingly, the court rejected Premier’s allegations of waiver.18
During the Survey period, there were several decisions from Georgia’s
federal district courts concerning suit limitation periods. In Chambers v.
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,19 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Georgia upheld a one-year suit limitation period,
despite the insured’s claim that the Georgia Supreme Court’s COVID-19
judicial emergency orders tolled the time limit. 20 Conversely, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in an unpublished
opinion, upheld the general principle that appraisal will toll the suit
limitation period while the appraisal is ongoing. 21 The United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia applied a “delayed
discovery rule” in Rountree v. Encompass Home & Auto Insurance Co.,
despite relying upon cases from other jurisdictions and only one Georgia
case that was physical precedent only.22
In JSPS, Inc. v. First Nonprofit Insurance Co.,23 the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Georgia concluded that a
question of fact might exist regarding an insurance company’s possible
waiver of a one-year suit period where the company did not deny the
claim until after the one-year period expired.24 Likewise, relying upon an
earlier decision from the Middle District concerning unresolved
diminished value (DV) claims,25 the Northern District in Huck v.
Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. 26 rejected strict enforcement of a
one-year suit period where the carrier failed to address DV claims before
the suit period expired.27
17. Id. at 627, 844 S.E.2d at 288.
18. Id.
19. No. 1:20-CV-2643-TWT, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206871 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 5, 2020).
20. Id. at *10.
21. Omni Health Sols., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 19-12406, 2021 U.S. App.
LEXIS 15126, at *25 (11th Cir. May 21, 2021).
22. 501 F.Supp.3d 1351, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2020).
23. No. 1:20-CV-21, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 207592 (M.D. Ga. Sep. 30, 2020).
24. Id. at *7.
25. Long v. State Farm Fire, 272 F. Supp. 3d 1344, 1349 (M.D. Ga. 2017).
26. No. 1:19-CV-03336, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191835 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 16, 2020)
27. Id. at *8–9.
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C. Water Damage and Bad Faith
During the Survey period, the district courts in Georgia also addressed
bad faith issues in several water damage cases. In Valles v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co.,28 the Northern District rejected an insured’s
attempt to bring tort claims against an insurer for allegedly underpaying
the insured’s claim when the only legal duty the insured relied upon for
the tort claims was the insurer’s duty under the insurance policy.29 The
Northern District rejected the insured’s attempt to create independent
duties under the Fair Business Practices Act and the Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices Act.30
Furthermore, the district court rejected the insured’s attempts to
formulate fraud and misrepresentation claims out of mere allegations
that the insurer mishandled the claim. 31 The district court held such
claims failed because they related solely to the insurer’s alleged failure
to pay the insurance claim, a duty that arose under the insurance
contract.32 For the same reasons, another judge in the Northern District
rejected tort and extra-contractual claims brought in another water
damage and mold case.33 In Passmore v. Travelers Casualty & Surety
Co.,34 the Southern District granted the insurer’s motion for summary
judgment on bad faith relating to damages from Hurricane Irma 35 but
denied the insurer’s motion regarding the insured’s alleged failure to
submit documents substantiating her claim. 36 The Southern District
concluded that there were disputed questions concerning the insured’s
cooperation and some conflicting opinions about the amount of the loss. 37
D. COVID-19
The district courts also weighed in on several COVID-19-related
property cases, particularly as those cases related to business losses. The
Northern District in Henry’s Louisiana Grill, Inc. v. Allied Insurance Co.
of America38 set the stage, rejecting a restaurant’s claim for lost business
28. No. 1:19-CV-5593, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18008 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 1, 2021).
29. Id. at *8.
30. Id. at *10–12.
31. Id. at *13.
32. Id. at *12–13.
33. Scott v. Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co., No. 1:20-CV-4420, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67262
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 24, 2021).
34. No. 2:19-CV-0059, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183397 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 2, 2020).
35. Id. at *31.
36. Id. at *19–20.
37. Id. at *31.
38. 495 F. Supp. 3d 1289 (N.D. Ga. 2020).
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income resulting from the public health emergency Georgia’s Governor
Kemp declared in an executive order.39 According to the Northern
District, the emergency order did not create a “direct physical loss”
necessary to a business income claim.40 The district court also rejected
the insured’s request for civil authority coverage because the governor’s
order did not limit access to private businesses or their operations. 41
Similarly in Johnson v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,42 another judge
in the Northern District concluded that a group of dentists and dental
practices seeking certification in a class action failed to demonstrate that
COVID-19 caused physical damage to their property sufficient to sustain
their claims for business interruption coverage against various
insurers.43 Despite the fact that the dentist offices might have been
“altered” by the virus, the court in Johnson adopted the more restrictive
view of physical damage that the district court in Henry’s Louisiana Grill
required. Likewise, the judge in Johnson adopted the analysis of the
district court in Henry’s Louisiana Grill as it related to civil authority
coverage.44 Similar analyses and results followed in K D Unlimited Inc.
v. Owners Insurance Co.,45 Karmel Davis & Associates. v. Hartford
Financial Services Group,46 Gilreath Family & Cosmetic Dentistry, Inc.
v. Cincinnati Insurance Co.,47 Lemontree Academy, LLC v. Utica Mutual
Insurance Co.,48 Restaurant Group Management v. Zurich American
Insurance Co.,49 Hilco, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,50 and G&A
Family Enterprises, LLC v. American Family Insurance Co. 51

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 1290.
Id. at 1296.
Id.
510 F. Supp. 3d 1326 (N.D. Ga. 2021).
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1337.
No. 1:20-CV-2163, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5926 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 5, 2021).
No. 1:20-CV-02181, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22896 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 26, 2021).
No. 1:20-CV-02248, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37150 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 1, 2021).
No. 3:20-CV-126, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92913 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 11, 2021).
No. 1:20-CV-4782, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94597 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 15, 2021).
No. 1:20-CV-4514, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78886 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 2021).
No. 1:20-CV-03192, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91942 (N.D. Ga. May 13, 2021).
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III. AUTOMOBILE CASES
A. Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance
1. Sovereign Immunity
Municipalities, like other branches of government, enjoy sovereign
immunity under Georgia law. 52 However, several Georgia statutes
provide for the waiver of sovereign immunities by municipalities when
their motor vehicles are involved in accidents. 53 And where a
municipality purchases motor vehicle insurance with limits in excess of
the mandatory waiver amount,54 the waiver extends to the limits
provided by the insurance policy.55
In Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co. v. City of College Park,56 the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that an insurance policy that provided a
business auto limit of $1 million and an excess liability limit of $4 million
could not also limit the coverage for damages a motor vehicle accident
caused to the statutory minimum waiver amount ($700,000) by an
endorsement which said the policy does not constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity and “[w]e have no duty to pay ‘damages’ on your
behalf under this policy unless the defenses of sovereign and
governmental immunity are inapplicable to you.”57
The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the City of
College Park after a vehicle pursued by College Park Police crashed into
the decedents’ vehicle, killing them. Atlantic Specialty Insurance
Company (Atlantic) intervened to litigate the limits of coverage it
provided to College Park. Atlantic insured College Park under a policy
that included business auto and excess liability coverage with a total
limit of $5 million. Both coverages contained disclaimers of any waiver of
sovereign immunity, and Atlantic did not have to pay damages unless
52. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 9; O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 (2021) (“[I]t is the public policy
of the State of Georgia that there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity of municipal
corporations of the state and such municipal corporations shall be immune from liability
for damages.”).
53. See O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1 (2021); O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (2021); O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2
(2021).
54. O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The sovereign immunity of local government entities for a loss arising out of
claims for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is waived up to the
following limits: . . . (3) . . . [A]n aggregate amount of $700,000.00 because of
bodily injury or death of two or more persons in any one occurrence.
55. O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51(b).
56. 357 Ga. App. 556, 851 S.E.2d 189 (2020), cert. granted, No. S21C0482, 2021 Ga.
LEXIS 564 (Jul. 7, 2021).
57. Id. at 558, 564, 851 S.E.2d at 192, 195.
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the defense of sovereign immunity was inapplicable. Atlantic argued that
the statutory minimum waiver limit of $700,000 applied.58 However, the
same statute states, “[t]he waiver provided by this chapter shall be
increased to the extent that . . . [t]he local government entity purchases
commercial liability insurance in an amount in excess of the waiver set
forth in this Code section.”59
Although the parties contracted to limit the waiver of sovereign
immunity to the statutory minimum, the court held that the
endorsement’s limitation was unenforceable as a violation of the General
Assembly’s clear intent to provide compensation for injuries arising out
of motor vehicle accidents.60 The court held that College Park’s purchase
of automobile liability insurance greater than $700,000 increased its
waiver of sovereign immunity to the full policy limits of $5 million. 61
2. The Cause Test
The Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the “cause test” in 2010 62 to
determine the number of “accidents” at issue for purposes of applying an
automobile liability policy when the insured struck two bicyclists in a
series of collisions.63 In Danner v. Travelers Property Casualty Insurance
Co.,64 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied
the cause test and held that where two other vehicles struck an
automobile in rapid succession, the series of collisions was a single
accident for purposes of determining the policy limits available. 65 The
insured, Danner, was struck by a truck and then, while he was stopped
in the road after the first impact, an SUV struck Danner. Danner could
not recall the difference in time between the two collisions but stated he
had not regained control of his vehicle when the second vehicle struck.
Danner and his wife filed a declaratory judgment action against their
insurer, seeking a ruling that the UM policy limit applied to each collision
separately.66
In determining whether the two collisions constituted a single
accident, the court considered that Danner had not regained control of
58. Id. at 557–59, 851 S.E.2d at 191–92.
59. O.C.G.A. § 36-92-2(d)(3).
60. Atl. Specialty, 357 Ga. App. at 563, 851 S.E.2d at 194; see also Atl. Specialty Ins.
Co. v. City of College Park, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
61. Id. at 565, 851 S.E.2d at 195–96.
62. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Matty, 286 Ga. 611, 615, 690 S.E.2d 614, 618 (2010).
63. Id. at 613, 690 S.E.2d at 617 (concluding that the “number of accidents is
determined by the number of causes of the injuries.”).
64. 848 Fed. App’x. 890 (11th Cir. 2021) (unpublished decision).
65. Id. at 892–93.
66. Id. at 891.
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his vehicle prior to the second collision and that he had no opportunity to
avoid the second collision.67 In addition, the court noted the absence of
any evidence that the second collision caused any separate and distinct
injuries.68 Therefore, the court affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment to the insurance company, holding the series of collisions
resulted from a single cause and was a singular “accident” under the
policy for purposes of determining the limits available.69
B. UM Cases
1. Unexcused Late Notice
The failure of insureds to notify their UM carriers of accidents and
injuries, and the courts’ interpretation of various policy language
requiring such notice, has been a recurring issue for many years. 70 The
court of appeals returned to this issue in two cases decided during the
Survey period.
In GEICO General Insurance Co. v. Breffle,71 the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that the insured’s thirteen-month delay in providing his
insurer notice of an accident was unreasonable as a matter of law when
the policy provision required notice “as soon as possible after an
accident.”72 GEICO insured Breffle under a motor vehicle policy that
provided $250,000 in UM coverage. Thirteen months after an accident,
and after having undergone extensive medical treatment, Breffle first
notified GEICO of the accident and then subsequently served GEICO as
an unnamed defendant in a lawsuit against the other driver. 73 The court
rejected Breffle’s argument that the notice provision was vague and
undefined and held that “[a]s soon as possible after the accident” is
unambiguous.74 The court rejected Breffle’s excuse for the delay in giving
notice—that he did not think he would need to use his UM coverage—as
a matter of law.75
67. Id. at 892; see Matty, 286 Ga. at 613, 690 S.E.2d at 617.
68. Id. at 892–93.
69. Id. at 893.
70. See Jenkins & Miller, Ga. Automobile Ins. § 35:2 (2020–2021 ed.); Martin, Wolff,
and Cave, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 111, 114–15
(2018); Wolff, Cave, and Schatz, Insurance, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 69 MERCER L.
REV. 117, 121–22 (2017).
71. 355 Ga. App. 276, 844 S.E.2d 179 (2020), cert. denied, 2021 Ga. LEXIS 45 (Jan. 11,
2021).
72. Id. at 278–79, 844 S.E.2d at 181–82.
73. Id. at 276, 844 S.E.2d at 179–80.
74. Id. at 278, 844 S.E.2d at 181.
75. Id. at 279, 844 S.E.2d at 181–82.
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In Hyde v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,76 the court
of appeals held that an insured’s twenty-two-month delay in providing
notice of an accident and possible UM claim to her insurer was
unjustified.77 On August 18, 2016, Hyde was involved in a collision while
driving her employer’s vehicle. At the time of the accident, Hyde had a
State Farm insurance policy that included UM coverage. Under the
policy, State Farm required the insured to provide notice of potential
claims and details of the injury and treatment “as soon as reasonably
possible after the injured insured is first examined or treated for the
injury.”78
A doctor examined Hyde for injuries on the day of the accident. Almost
four months later, Hyde’s lawyer wrote to her employer, giving notice of
a potential UM claim under the employer’s policy on its vehicle. The
employer, also a State Farm insured, notified the insurer of the claim
under its own coverage. When Hyde served State Farm as a UM carrier
in her suit against the other driver on June 13, 2018, State Farm argued
that Hyde failed to comply with the notice condition of her policy.79
The court held that although Hyde provided notice to her employer,
her policy required Hyde to provide notice directly to State Farm and
insurers are not required to cross-reference claims to determine if the
parties involved have other insurance with the company. 80 Hyde argued
that the policy language was ambiguous because it required reporting a
“claim” without defining the term or when a claim arises. 81 Given that
the other driver had liability insurance, Hyde argued that when a claim
for UM benefits arose was a question of fact. 82 The court rejected that
argument, holding the policy unambiguously required reporting to the
carrier “as soon as reasonably possible after the injured insured is first
examined or treated for the injury,” not “as soon as reasonably possible”
after she knew she might present a UM claim.83
Finally, the court distinguished this case from Progressive Mountain
Insurance Co. v. Bishop, where an eleven-month delay in providing notice
was potentially justified because Bishop notified the insurer a year before
undergoing surgery.84 Whereas Hyde provided notice approximately

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

356 Ga. App. 533, 848 S.E.2d 145 (2020).
Id. at 538, 848 S.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 537, 848 S.E.2d at 148.
Id. at 534–35, 848 S.E.2d at 146–47.
Id. at 538, 848 S.E.2d at 149.
Id. at 536, 848 S.E.2d at 147.
Id. at 537, 848 S.E.2d at 148.
Id.
338 Ga. App. 115, 790 S.E.2d 91 (2016).
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three months after surgery and more than a year after she notified her
employer of a potential UM claim. 85 Therefore, the court held Hyde’s
delay in notifying her insurer was unexcused and unreasonable as a
matter of law.86
2. UM Coverage for the Insured’s Vehicle
The Uninsured Motorist Act and most, if not all policies, exclude from
the definition of “uninsured motor vehicle” a vehicle which is “owned by
or furnished for the regular use of the named insured, the spouse of the
named insured, and, while residents of the same household, the relative
of either.”87 The question in Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Parker,88 was
whether that exclusion applied when the injured “insured” was a minor
child who did not own or operate the vehicle.89
Tyler Parker was the named insured of a policy covering a Ford F-150
truck. Tyler crashed the truck with his daughter, Savannah Parker,
riding in the passenger seat. Savannah’s guardian ad litem sued Tyler’s
estate and had Auto-Owners Insurance Company served as a UM carrier.
Auto-Owners paid the liability policy limit but argued it had no liability
under the UM coverage because Tyler owned the truck and therefore
could not be “uninsured” under the policy or statute. 90 The Georgia Court
of Appeals held that the exclusion applied to vehicles that the named
insured owned or had available for regular use. 91 In conclusion, the court
quoted this maxim from Jenkins & Miller: “the insured motor vehicle
cannot be the uninsured motor vehicle.”92
3. Due Diligence Required for Renewal of UM Lawsuit
Although section 9-2-61 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
permits the renewal of a lawsuit outside the statute of limitations where
the plaintiff files a renewal action within six months of a voluntary
dismissal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Durland v. Colotl,93 that
there can be no renewal of a lawsuit against a tortfeasor and a UM carrier
where service on the tortfeasor in the original action was accomplished

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 120, 790 S.E.2d at 96; Hyde, 356 Ga. App. at 537, 848 S.E.2d at 148.
Hyde, 356 Ga. App. at 538, 848 S.E.2d at 149.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(b)(1)(D) (2021).
359 Ga. App. 267, 857 S.E.2d 245 (2021).
Id. at 269, 857 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 267–68, 857 S.E.2d at 247.
Id. at 269, 857 S.E.2d at 248.
Id. at 270, 857 S.E.2d at 249 (quoting Jenkins & Miller, supra note 70, at § 32:1).
359 Ga. App. 170, 855 S.E.2d 83 (2021).
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only by publication.94 However, the result might have been different if
the plaintiff had exercised due diligence to locate the tortfeasor after the
publication service as required by section 33-7-11(e) of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated.95
Durland sued the defendant and his own UM carrier, USAA, on
November 28, 2016, following a motor vehicle accident. The trial court
granted Durland’s request to serve the defendant by publication after
Durland was unable to personally serve him. After publication, Durland
no longer pursued efforts to obtain personal jurisdiction over the
defendant. USAA moved to dismiss the action on the ground that
Durland did not exercise diligence in locating the defendant. On January
10, 2019, Durland dismissed his action, and he then filed a renewal on
June 4, 2019, after the statute of limitations had expired. The Dekalb
Superior Court granted USAA’s motion to dismiss the renewal action on
the ground that section 9-2-61 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
only permits the renewal of actions that were valid at the time of
dismissal, and without personal service, the original action was not
valid.96
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that an action served only by
publication is not a pending action against the defendant because the
trial court does not have personal jurisdiction and, therefore, the case
cannot be dismissed and renewed outside the limitations period. 97
Further, the court held that Durland’s failure to continue exercising due
diligence to locate Colotl after the publication in the original action, as
section 33-7-11(e) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated requires,
meant that the publication service “never ripened into personal
service.”98 Although the court of appeals did not cite any authority for the
proposition that publication service could “ripen” into personal service by
the continuing exercise of due diligence, the outcome of this case might
have been in Durland’s favor had he made reasonable efforts to find
Colotl after publishing notice in the original action. As it was, the court
affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, concluding that Durland could not
renew his suit “in view of his failure to personally serve Colotl in the
original action, following service by publication and a lack of diligence to
locate Colotl.”99

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 175, 855 S.E.2d at 87.
O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(e).
Id. at 171, 855 S.E.2d at 84–85.
Id. at 174–75, 855 S.E.2d at 87.
Id.
Id. at 175, 855 S.E.2d at 87.
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IV. LIABILITY CASES
Georgia courts once again addressed the bad faith ramifications for an
insurance company’s failure to meet demands and settle claims in four
separate appellate decisions this past Survey period. In response to
certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court of Georgia in GEICO Indemnity Co.
v. Whiteside100 addressed an insurer’s obligation to settle a claim against
its insured—even if that insured failed to give notice of the lawsuit to
that carrier—and resulting bad faith consequences.101 While driving
Karen Griffis’s Ford Explorer as a permissive driver, Winslett struck
Guthrie, who was riding a bicycle. Guthrie’s lawyer sent GEICO, who
insured Griffis, a letter demanding GEICO tender its $30,000 policy
limits to settle the liability claim against Winslett. GEICO rejected the
settlement demand.102
Several weeks later, Guthrie filed suit against Winslett. However,
Winslett did not send GEICO the suit papers or inform GEICO of the
lawsuit despite language in the GEICO policy requiring such notice. The
Superior Court of Muscogee County later entered a default judgment of
$2,916,204 against Winslett who then filed bankruptcy. Guthrie’s
attorney was permitted to represent the bankruptcy trustee, Whiteside,
who in turn filed a lawsuit against GEICO alleging it negligently or in
bad faith failed to settle Guthrie’s claim against Winslett. 103 In response,
GEICO claimed that the policy’s notice provision, and section 33-7-15 of
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated relieved GEICO of liability for the
judgment, as Winslett never notified GEICO of Guthrie’s lawsuit. 104
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
concluded Winslett’s failure to notify GEICO did not prevent her or the
trustee from recovering in tort for GEICO’s negligent or bad faith failure
to settle under “circumstances where GEICO was a proximate cause of
Winslett’s failure to give notice of the lawsuit.” 105 GEICO appealed to the

100. 311 Ga. 346, 857 S.E.2d 654 (2021).
101. Id. at 346, 857 S.E.2d at 657–58.
102. Id. at 346–47, 857 S.E.2d at 658.
103. Id. at 347–48, 857 S.E.2d at 658–59.
104. Id. at 348–49,857 S.E.2d at 659; O.C.G.A. § 33-7-15(b) (2000) provides that
noncompliance by the insured with a policy provision which requires the insured to send
his insurer a copy of every summons or other process “shall constitute a breach of the
insurance contract which, if prejudicial to the insurer, shall relieve the insurer of its
obligation to defend the insureds under the policy and of any liability to pay any judgment
or other sum on behalf of its insureds.”
105. Id. at 349, 857 S.E.2d at 660.
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Eleventh Circuit, which certified three questions to the Georgia Supreme
Court.106
In response to the first question, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Whiteside conclusively held that O.C.G.A. § 33-7-15 did not relieve
GEICO of liability for a bad faith failure to settle, even if GEICO never
received notice of the lawsuit from its insured’s permissive driver. 107
Notably, the supreme court concluded the issue was not whether
Winslett breached a condition precedent to coverage, which “she did,” but
rather whether Winslett’s breach was an “intervening act” sufficient to
break the causal chain between GEICO’s “unreasonable rejection” of the
demand and the excess default judgment. 108 The supreme court reasoned
GEICO reasonably should have foreseen Winslett’s breach, as she was
not the named insured under the policy and would not have a copy of the
policy language, among other factors.109 The supreme court concluded a
reasonable insurance company, such as GEICO, could determine that
such a person may not provide notice of a lawsuit.110 The supreme court
ultimately concluded that while the language of O.C.G.A. § 33-7-15 and
the insurance policy’s notice provisions relieves an insurer of providing a
benefit under the policy, it did not foreclose the possibility of the insurer’s
tort liability that may arise out of that contractual relationship in a later
suit, and such tort suits were not precluded as a matter of law. 111
Second, the supreme court in Whiteside concluded that an insured can
sue an insurer for bad faith when, after the insurer refused to settle but
before the trial court entered judgment against the insured, the insured
lost coverage for failing to adhere to the notice provision in the policy. 112
Specifically, as GEICO accepted liability for the accident on behalf of the
permissive driver shortly after the accident occurred, GEICO’s duty to
settle arose as soon as it received Guthrie’s time-limited policy demand,

106. Id. at 349–50, 857 S.E.2d at 660.
107. Id. at 355, 857 S.E.2d at 663.
108. Id. (noting the policy’s notice requirement was directed at “you,” which was more
narrowly defined than “insured,” as “the policyholder named in the declarations or his or
her spouse if a resident of the same household.” However, the policy uses language
discussing the duty to defend “you and any other insureds” and to pay judgments on “your
and any other insureds[‘] behalf.” The policy also discussed notice from the injured party in
terms of “if the insured has failed to give written notice.”).
109. Id. at 355–56, 857 S.E.2d at 664. The district court also noted she was “not stable,”
and living in an apartment with no electricity. Id.
110. Id. at 356, 857 S.E.2d at 664.
111. Id. at 359–60, 857 S.E.2d at 666.
112. Id. at 359, 857 S.E.2d at 666.
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and the supreme court rejected GEICO’s argument that no bad faith
claim existed until an excess judgment was rendered.113
Finally, the supreme court in Whiteside held that an insurer has no
right to contest special damages in a “follow-on suit” for bad faith, even
if it had no prior notice of or participation in that suit. 114 The supreme
court concluded Georgia law was well settled that “after an insurer’s
liability for wrongful refusal to settle a claim against its insured is
established, the insured or its assignee is entitled as a matter of law to
recover damages equal to the amount by which the judgment exceeds
policy coverage.”115 The supreme court reasoned if Winslett’s bankruptcy
estate did not recover enough from GEICO to satisfy Guthrie’s judgment,
her estate would not be fully compensated for her damages, and GEICO
would escape responsibility for breaching its settlement duty to
Winslett.116
The Georgia Court of Appeals also confronted the potential
ramifications for insurers in handling time-limited demands in three
separate decisions, with notable commentary by Chief Judge Christopher
McFadden in two of those decisions regarding the unexpected results
created in the realm of bad faith litigation since the court’s ruling in
Southern General Insurance Co. v. Holt.117 First, in Pritchard v.
Mendoza,118 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed an order enforcing a
settlement, and concluded that there was no binding settlement when
the insurer did not accept the “precise terms” of the time-limited
demand.119
Pritchard was injured in an automobile accident and made a timelimited demand to Progressive Insurance Company under section
9-11-67.1 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, which set forth a
number of terms, including that Pritchard would not “agree to any
specific venue provisions” or “choice of law provisions.” The time-limited
demand further mandated that the payment of the $25,000 limit was not
full and complete compensation to Pritchard and that Progressive could
not include any language in the release to the contrary. Progressive
113. Id. at 359–60, 857 S.E.2d at 666–67.
114. Id. at 360, 857 S.E.2d at 667.
115. Id. at 360–61, 857 S.E.2d at 667 (quoting Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Brightman,
256 Ga. App. 451, 456, 568 S.E.2d 498, 456 (2002), aff’d, 276 Ga. 683, 580 S.E.2d 519
(2003)).
116. Id. at 361–62, 857 S.E.2d at 668.
117. 262 Ga. 267, 416 S.E.2d 274 (1992) (holding an insured has a claim for bad faith
against an insurance company for its failure to settle a claim within the policy limits based
on time-limited settlement offer by the injured person’s attorney).
118. 357 Ga. App. 283, 850 S.E.2d 472 (2020).
119. Id. at 289, 850 S.E.2d at 476.
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accepted the demand, sent a check for $25,000, but also sent a “Georgia
General Release” which included language that, for “sole consideration”
of $25,000, Pritchard released Mendoza from any further claims.
Further, the release stated that its terms were to be construed under
Georgia law.120
Counsel for Pritchard informed Progressive that its release violated
the demand and filed suit. Progressive filed a motion to enforce the
settlement, which the trial court granted. Pritchard appealed, claiming
that Progressive’s response was “not identical, unequivocal, and without
variance” of the demand.121 The court of appeals agreed, holding that
Progressive failed to comply with section 9-11-67.1 when it did not
submit a conforming release as required by the demand. 122 Since
Progressive’s release contained improper choice-of-law and sufficiencyof-consideration language, the court concluded Progressive failed to
perform an act as required for acceptance of the demand and that there
was no binding settlement.123
In two other decisions from the Georgia Court of Appeals—White v.
Cheek124 and Wright v. Nelson125—Chief Judge McFadden wrote separate
concurrences regarding the enforcement of time-limited demand
settlements and the so-called “perverse incentive” to “set up a bad faith
claim” which has arisen since the Holt decision.126 In White, the demand
specifically required that any communications related to the demand
“must be made in writing.”127 Yet, the claims adjuster with GEICO left
voicemails with counsel for the claimant, inquiring if its insured was
actually involved in the automobile accident, as GEICO’s investigation
revealed it was a hit and run collision. 128 The court concluded that
GEICO “violated” the requirement that communications be in writing,
and the parties did not reach a binding settlement agreement under
section 9-11-67.1.129
Chief Judge McFadden concurred specially, claiming GEICO’s
voicemails were “reasonable clarifications of facts” relevant to the offer
120. Id. at 284–86, 850 S.E.2d at 473–75.
121. Id. at 286–87, 850 S.E.2d at 475.
122. Id. at 289, 850 S.E.2d at 476.
123. Id.
124. 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 236, 859 S.E.2d 104 (2021) (McFadden, C.J., concurring
specially).
125. 358 Ga. App. 871, 856 S.E.2d 421 (2021) (McFadden, C.J., concurring fully and
specially).
126. White, 2021 Ga. App. LEXIS 236, at *12, 859 S.E.2d at 110.
127. Id. at *2, 859 S.E.2d at 106.
128. Id. at *5–6, 859 S.E.2d at 107.
129. Id. at *11–12, 859 S.E.2d at 109.

2021

INSURANCE

135

but were not a counteroffer.130 Moreover, he noted that while the
claimant could proceed towards a bad faith claim, such a claim “would
lack merit because of the onerous requirements” included in the demand
letter itself and because the letter was “compelling, if not dispositive,
evidence of a lack of intent to settle the claim and so of bad faith.” 131
Similarly in Wright, the court of appeals held that the plaintiff
accepted a demand and reached a binding settlement when Allstate
tendered the policy limits and indicated an intent to follow up with a
written release.132 After the plaintiff accepted the demand, an attorney
from Allstate sent a “proposed” limited liability release accompanied by
a letter stating that if the release “meets with your approval, please have
your client sign it and return the original to me.”133 The court of appeals
concluded that the trial court erred in finding no enforceable agreement
because an “objectively reasonable person would understand” the cover
letter from Allstate’s attorney sought the claimant’s approval of the
proposed release and was not “objecting” to the terms of the settlement
agreement.134
Writing separately, Chief Judge McFadden expressed concern that
“plaintiffs’ attorneys have incentives contrary” to the judicially expressed
intent in Holt to resolve claims or risk bad faith exposure, and “plaintiffs
sometimes structure offers not to reach settlements, but rather to elicit
rejections.”135 Chief Judge McFadden’s concurrence hinted that the
Georgia General Assembly could address these potential pitfalls by
establishing a “safe harbor, specifying conduct by insurers that would
constitute good faith as a matter of law.”136
V. CONCLUSION
Few insurance decisions during this Survey period were
groundbreaking or reflected significant changes in Georgia law. There
were only a small number of Georgia Court of Appeals decisions in the
property context with most arising from the district courts. In the
automobile context, the Georgia Court of Appeals continued to address
the intricacies of UM law while addressing minor issues relating to
general automobile liability. The principal liability or third-party cases
during the Survey period, however, focused on the pitfalls of responding
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at *14, 859 S.E.2d at 110.
Id. at *13, 19 859 S.E.2d at 110, 112.
358 Ga. App. at 871, 856 S.E.2d at 422.
Id. at 873, 856 S.E.2d at 423.
Id. at 875–76, 856 S.E.2d at 424–25.
Id. at 876–77, 856 S.E.2d at 425.
Id. at 880, 856 S.E.2d at 427.
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to time-limited demands, with the Chief Judge of the Georgia Court of
Appeals sending out a clarion call to action for the Georgia legislature.

